Social Dilemmas and Justice
|Kod przedmiotu:||2500-EN-F-194||Kod Erasmus / ISCED:||14.4 / (0313) Psychologia|
|Nazwa przedmiotu:||Social Dilemmas and Justice|
electives for 3,4 and 5 year
Social Psychology basket
|Punkty ECTS i inne:||
zobacz reguły punktacji
(tylko po angielsku)
People, groups, organizations, and even nations are frequently faced with
decisions in which there is conflict between individually rational (selfish,
competitive) and collectively rational (cooperative, egalitarian) choices.
This conflict of interest is commonly referred to as a “social dilemma”. In
this class, we will integrate different perspectives to understand how
features of the person, situation, and culture influence decisions in
different types of social dilemmas.
(tylko po angielsku)
Research in social dilemmas has an element of fun - experimental games.
These game settings represent decisions in which individuals are socially
interdependent with each other; the actions of all decision makers in the
situation influence the outcomes of all of the others involved. Decades of
research has used these games to help understand social motivations,
trust, and power/control as predictors of cooperative and noncooperative
behavior in social dilemmas. How people behave in these
social dilemmas can have major implications for areas such as resource
conservation, democratic processes, and international conflict. The
course will be divided into 3 parts,
Part 1: We will define social dilemmas conceptually and then define them
operationally. For the operational definition we will quantify social
dilemmas with the most commonly used paradigm: Games. We will
examine different types of social dilemma games with a focus on why
they are used, what types of social psychological constructs are at play
(i.e., fear, greed, trust, self-interest, altruism), and how these games can
be applied in understanding human decisions and behavior.
Part 2: We will learn about different theoretical perspectives on social
dilemmas, taking an interdisciplinary approach that integrates views from
psychology along with other disciplines such as economics, biology,
political science, anthropology, and sociology. First, we will consider how
cooperation and competition can be explained in terms of evolutionary
pressures. Secondly, individual differences in psychology will be examined
as predictors of cooperation such as morality, trust, and preferences for
control. Finally, we will consider how cultural influences can shape
socially interdependent relationships with an emphasis on whether
cultures differ on how they handle social dilemmas.
Part 3: We will take a closer look at the structure of social dilemmas and
how research can be utilized to address applied problems. The structure
of a social dilemma can dictate the balance of power, resources, and risk
inherent in a social interaction. We will examine recent research that has
begun to establish biological and neuroscientific foundations of
(tylko po angielsku)
*** Note: this list contains possible topics that will be covered. It is likely
that some items will be removed based on scheduling and class time
Handbook: Van Lange, P. A. M., Balliet, D.P, Parks, C. D., & Van Vugt, M.
(2013). Social Dilemmas: Understanding Human Cooperation. Oxford
University Press, USA.
1) Introduction to social dilemmas:
Textbook Ch. 1
Textbook Ch. 2
2) Situational differences in social interdependence:
Rapoport & Chammah (1965) Ch. 1
3) Individual differences in social value orientation:
Textbook Ch. 4
Kuhlman & Marshello (1975)
4) Fairness in social decisions
Liebrand et al. (1986)
5) Reciprocity and evolutionary theory
Textbook Ch. 3
Karagonlar & Kuhlman (2013)
6) Trust & Cultural influences
Delhey, Newton, & Welzel (2013)
7) Fear and aggression in international conflict
Jing et al. (2017)
8) Trustworthiness and honesty
Weisel & Shalvi (2015)
9) Peer Punishment
Textbook Ch. 5
Eriksson et al. (2017)
10) The threat of social exclusion
Stivers et al. (2009)
11) Preferences for control
Kelley et al. (2003)
12) Power advantage in social dilemmas
13) Resource advantage in social relationships
14) Risk in social relationships
Ng & Au (2015)
15) Mindfulness in social relationships
Van Doesum et al. (2013)
Supplemental Required and Recommended Readings:
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of
Psychology, 31, 169-193.
Delhey, J., Newton, K., & Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust
in “most people”? Solving the radius of trust problem. American
Sociological Review, 76, 786-807. doi:
Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Andersson, P. A., Aveyard, M., Brauer,
M., Gritskov, V., … Yamagishi, T. (2017). Cultural universals and
cultural differences in meta-norms about peer punishment.
Management and Organization Review. Advance online
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994).
Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic
Behavior, 6, 347-369.
Jing, Y., Gries, P. H., Li, Y., Stivers, A. W., Mifune, N., Kuhlman, D.
M., Bai, L. (2017). War or peace? How the subjective perception
of great power interdependence shapes preemptive defensive
aggression. Frontiers in Psychology, 8:864. doi:
Karagonlar, G. & Kuhlman, D. M. (2013). The role of social value
orientation in response to an unfair offer in the ultimatum game.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 228-
239. DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.006.
Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., &
Van Lange, Paul A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Kuhlman, D. M. & Marshello, A. F. J. (1975). Individual differences
in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy
effects in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 32, 922-931.
Liebrand, W. B., Jansen, R. W., Rijken, V. M., & Suhre, C. J. (1986).
Might over morality: Social values and the perception of other
players in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 22(3), 203-215.
Ng, G. T. T., & Au, W. T. (2015). Expectation and cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 353-360.
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s dilemma.
Ann Arbor, MI: Univesity of Michigan Press.
Stivers, A. (2009). Happy or sad: When people face the threat of
social exclusion (Unpublished Honors thesis). Michigan State
University, East Lansing, MI.
Stivers, A. W. (2016). More for me or more for you? The effects of
power and resource asymmetry on cooperation (Order No.
10191778). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses
Global. (1840889168). Retrieved from
Van Doesum, N. J., Van Lange, Dion A. W., & Van Lange, Paul A.
M. (2013). Social mindfulness: Skill and will to navigate the social
world. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(1), 86-
Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2015). The collaborative roots of
corruption. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
112, 10651-10656. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1423035112
|Efekty uczenia się:||
(tylko po angielsku)
An increased understanding of the interaction between situational and
intra-personal determinants of behavior in social dilemmas.
Articulate what it means for decision makers to be socially
Quantify and illustrate different types of social dilemmas as games.
Provide examples of individual differences and describe how they
influence decisions in social dilemmas.
Provide examples of environmental characteristics that can influence
cooperation or competition.
Interpret perspectives on how justice can be achieved in social
Read and interrogate empirical, peer-reviewed research.
Articulate how “real-world” problems related to justice such as
international conflict, organizational relationships, and political power
can be framed as social dilemmas.
|Metody i kryteria oceniania:||
(tylko po angielsku)
1) In-class assignments (33%)
2) Quizzes (67%)
Most classes include an in class assignment and a quiz. The lowest 2
grades on in class assignments will be dropped and the lowest 2 grades on
quizzes will be dropped. This makes it possible for students to have up to
2 unexcused absences with no penalty. If all absences are excused, a
student may have up to 4 absences with no penalty. Additional absences
will result in points being deducted from the final grade.
Właścicielem praw autorskich jest Uniwersytet Warszawski.