Uniwersytet Warszawski - Centralny System Uwierzytelniania
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Social Dilemmas and Justice

Informacje ogólne

Kod przedmiotu: 2500-EN-PS-EAc6-04
Kod Erasmus / ISCED: 14.4 Kod klasyfikacyjny przedmiotu składa się z trzech do pięciu cyfr, przy czym trzy pierwsze oznaczają klasyfikację dziedziny wg. Listy kodów dziedzin obowiązującej w programie Socrates/Erasmus, czwarta (dotąd na ogół 0) – ewentualne uszczegółowienie informacji o dyscyplinie, piąta – stopień zaawansowania przedmiotu ustalony na podstawie roku studiów, dla którego przedmiot jest przeznaczony. / (0313) Psychologia Kod ISCED - Międzynarodowa Standardowa Klasyfikacja Kształcenia (International Standard Classification of Education) została opracowana przez UNESCO.
Nazwa przedmiotu: Social Dilemmas and Justice
Jednostka: Wydział Psychologii
Grupy: Academic basket
Elective courses
electives for 3,4 and 5 year
Social Psychology basket
Punkty ECTS i inne: 4.00 Podstawowe informacje o zasadach przyporządkowania punktów ECTS:
  • roczny wymiar godzinowy nakładu pracy studenta konieczny do osiągnięcia zakładanych efektów uczenia się dla danego etapu studiów wynosi 1500-1800 h, co odpowiada 60 ECTS;
  • tygodniowy wymiar godzinowy nakładu pracy studenta wynosi 45 h;
  • 1 punkt ECTS odpowiada 25-30 godzinom pracy studenta potrzebnej do osiągnięcia zakładanych efektów uczenia się;
  • tygodniowy nakład pracy studenta konieczny do osiągnięcia zakładanych efektów uczenia się pozwala uzyskać 1,5 ECTS;
  • nakład pracy potrzebny do zaliczenia przedmiotu, któremu przypisano 3 ECTS, stanowi 10% semestralnego obciążenia studenta.
Język prowadzenia: angielski
Rodzaj przedmiotu:


Skrócony opis: (tylko po angielsku)

People, groups, organizations, and even nations are frequently faced with

decisions in which there is conflict between individually rational (selfish,

competitive) and collectively rational (cooperative, egalitarian) choices.

This conflict of interest is commonly referred to as a “social dilemma”. In

this class, we will integrate different perspectives to understand how

features of the person, situation, and culture influence decisions in

different types of social dilemmas.

Pełny opis: (tylko po angielsku)

Research in social dilemmas has an element of fun - experimental games.

These game settings represent decisions in which individuals are socially

interdependent with each other; the actions of all decision makers in the

situation influence the outcomes of all of the others involved. Decades of

research has used these games to help understand social motivations,

trust, and power/control as predictors of cooperative and noncooperative

behavior in social dilemmas. How people behave in these

social dilemmas can have major implications for areas such as resource

conservation, democratic processes, and international conflict. The

course will be divided into 3 parts,

Part 1: We will define social dilemmas conceptually and then define them

operationally. For the operational definition we will quantify social

dilemmas with the most commonly used paradigm: Games. We will

examine different types of social dilemma games with a focus on why

they are used, what types of social psychological constructs are at play

(i.e., fear, greed, trust, self-interest, altruism), and how these games can

be applied in understanding human decisions and behavior.

Part 2: We will learn about different theoretical perspectives on social

dilemmas, taking an interdisciplinary approach that integrates views from

psychology along with other disciplines such as economics, biology,

political science, anthropology, and sociology. First, we will consider how

cooperation and competition can be explained in terms of evolutionary

pressures. Secondly, individual differences in psychology will be examined

as predictors of cooperation such as morality, trust, and preferences for

control. Finally, we will consider how cultural influences can shape

socially interdependent relationships with an emphasis on whether

cultures differ on how they handle social dilemmas.

Part 3: We will take a closer look at the structure of social dilemmas and

how research can be utilized to address applied problems. The structure

of a social dilemma can dictate the balance of power, resources, and risk

inherent in a social interaction. We will examine recent research that has

begun to establish biological and neuroscientific foundations of


Literatura: (tylko po angielsku)

*** Note: this list contains possible topics that will be covered. It is likely

that some items will be removed based on scheduling and class time


Handbook: Van Lange, P. A. M., Balliet, D.P, Parks, C. D., & Van Vugt, M.

(2013). Social Dilemmas: Understanding Human Cooperation. Oxford

University Press, USA.

Section 1

1) Introduction to social dilemmas:

 Textbook Ch. 1

 Textbook Ch. 2

2) Situational differences in social interdependence:

 Rapoport & Chammah (1965) Ch. 1

3) Individual differences in social value orientation:

 Textbook Ch. 4

 Kuhlman & Marshello (1975)

Section 2

4) Fairness in social decisions

 Liebrand et al. (1986)

 Forsythe (1994)

5) Reciprocity and evolutionary theory

 Textbook Ch. 3

 Karagonlar & Kuhlman (2013)

6) Trust & Cultural influences

 Delhey, Newton, & Welzel (2013)

7) Fear and aggression in international conflict

 Jing et al. (2017)

8) Trustworthiness and honesty

 Weisel & Shalvi (2015)

Section 3

9) Peer Punishment

 Textbook Ch. 5

 Eriksson et al. (2017)

10) The threat of social exclusion

 Stivers et al. (2009)

11) Preferences for control

 Kelley et al. (2003)

12) Power advantage in social dilemmas

 Stivers (2016)

13) Resource advantage in social relationships

 Stivers (2016)

14) Risk in social relationships

 Ng & Au (2015)

15) Mindfulness in social relationships

 Van Doesum et al. (2013)

Supplemental Required and Recommended Readings:

 Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of

Psychology, 31, 169-193.

 Delhey, J., Newton, K., & Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust

in “most people”? Solving the radius of trust problem. American

Sociological Review, 76, 786-807. doi:


 Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Andersson, P. A., Aveyard, M., Brauer,

M., Gritskov, V., … Yamagishi, T. (2017). Cultural universals and

cultural differences in meta-norms about peer punishment.

Management and Organization Review. Advance online

publication. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2017.42

 Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994).

Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic

Behavior, 6, 347-369.

 Jing, Y., Gries, P. H., Li, Y., Stivers, A. W., Mifune, N., Kuhlman, D.

M., Bai, L. (2017). War or peace? How the subjective perception

of great power interdependence shapes preemptive defensive

aggression. Frontiers in Psychology, 8:864. doi:


 Karagonlar, G. & Kuhlman, D. M. (2013). The role of social value

orientation in response to an unfair offer in the ultimatum game.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 228-

239. DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.006.

 Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., &

Van Lange, Paul A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations

Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.


 Kuhlman, D. M. & Marshello, A. F. J. (1975). Individual differences

in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy

effects in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 32, 922-931.

 Liebrand, W. B., Jansen, R. W., Rijken, V. M., & Suhre, C. J. (1986).

Might over morality: Social values and the perception of other

players in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social

Psychology, 22(3), 203-215.

 Ng, G. T. T., & Au, W. T. (2015). Expectation and cooperation in

prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness.

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 353-360.


 Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s dilemma.

Ann Arbor, MI: Univesity of Michigan Press.

 Stivers, A. (2009). Happy or sad: When people face the threat of

social exclusion (Unpublished Honors thesis). Michigan State

University, East Lansing, MI.

 Stivers, A. W. (2016). More for me or more for you? The effects of

power and resource asymmetry on cooperation (Order No.

10191778). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses

Global. (1840889168). Retrieved from



 Van Doesum, N. J., Van Lange, Dion A. W., & Van Lange, Paul A.

M. (2013). Social mindfulness: Skill and will to navigate the social

world. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(1), 86-

103. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032540

 Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2015). The collaborative roots of

corruption. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,

112, 10651-10656. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1423035112

Efekty uczenia się: (tylko po angielsku)

An increased understanding of the interaction between situational and

intra-personal determinants of behavior in social dilemmas.

 Articulate what it means for decision makers to be socially


 Quantify and illustrate different types of social dilemmas as games.

 Provide examples of individual differences and describe how they

influence decisions in social dilemmas.

 Provide examples of environmental characteristics that can influence

cooperation or competition.

 Interpret perspectives on how justice can be achieved in social


 Read and interrogate empirical, peer-reviewed research.

 Articulate how “real-world” problems related to justice such as

international conflict, organizational relationships, and political power

can be framed as social dilemmas.

Metody i kryteria oceniania: (tylko po angielsku)

1) In-class assignments (33%)

2) Quizzes (67%)

Attendance rules

Most classes include an in class assignment and a quiz. The lowest 2

grades on in class assignments will be dropped and the lowest 2 grades on

quizzes will be dropped. This makes it possible for students to have up to

2 unexcused absences with no penalty. If all absences are excused, a

student may have up to 4 absences with no penalty. Additional absences

will result in points being deducted from the final grade.

Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr letni 2023/24" (zakończony)

Okres: 2024-02-19 - 2024-06-16
Wybrany podział planu:
Przejdź do planu
Typ zajęć:
Seminarium, 30 godzin więcej informacji
Koordynatorzy: (brak danych)
Prowadzący grup: Adam Stivers
Lista studentów: (nie masz dostępu)
Zaliczenie: Przedmiot - Zaliczenie na ocenę
Seminarium - Zaliczenie na ocenę
Opisy przedmiotów w USOS i USOSweb są chronione prawem autorskim.
Właścicielem praw autorskich jest Uniwersytet Warszawski.
Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa
tel: +48 22 55 20 000 https://uw.edu.pl/
kontakt deklaracja dostępności mapa serwisu USOSweb (2024-06-10)