Advanced Game Theory in Sociology

elective courses

Game Theory is very popular and widely used in social sciences. One cannot imagine modern microeconomics without it. Yet, it has also been criticized. One close alternative is Evolutionary Game Theory that originates from biology. The class described here is meant to teach the participants the basic assumptions of Game Theory, especially Evolutionary Game Theory. It is also meant to show how Game Theory is being used in social sciences such as sociology, economics, psychology, anthropology and political sciences. There are three parts of the program. The first part is a short introduction to non-cooperative Game Theory. In the second part Evolutionary Game Theory is discussed. Finally, the third part discusses applications of Game Theory in modern social sciences. It covers such problems as evolution of conventions, social norms, altruism, trust and ethnic symbols and is based o both theoretical and empirical material.

Game Theory is very popular and widely used in social sciences. It takes many different forms and is applied to many different problems. One cannot imagine modern microeconomics without it. Yet, it has also been criticized. One of its close alternatives is Evolutionary Game Theory that originates from biology. Evolutionary Game Theory shares some assumptions and ideas with traditional Game Theory, but it also has some that are completely original. The class described here is meant to teach the participants what are the most basic characteristics of Evolutionary Game Theory and how it is being used in social sciences such as sociology, economics, psychology, anthropology and political sciences.The program includes three parts:1. Introduction to non-cooperative Game TheoryBefore Evolutionary Game Theory can be introduced it is necessary to discuss the most important elements of classical non-cooperative Game Theory. We will use examples of the best known games such as Prisoner's Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes to introduce some important concepts. We will talk about dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, and subgame perfection. Next, we will discuss repeated games using an example of famous Tit For Tat strategy. Finally we will talk about payoffs discounting and introduce Folk Theorem.2. Evolutionary Game TheoryAfter finishing the first module of the course the students will be well prepared to get to know the most important characteristics of Evolutionary Game Theory. We will read some of the early works on it taken from biology. Next, we will introduce and analyze the basic concepts such as ecology of strategies, evolutionary dynamics, and evolutionary stability. They will be accompanied by simple examples.3. Applications of Game Theory in social sciencesIn the last module of the class we will concentrate on applications of Game Theory in social sciences. We will discuss a number of scientific publications on such topics as evolution of conventions, social norms, altruism, trust, or ethnic symbols. Some of them are purely theoretical, while others are based on computer simulations and experiments with real people.

Literatura (lista może ulec modyfikacjom):Axelrod, Robert, 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: BasicBooks (fragmenty).Bendor, Jonathan, Piotr Swistak, 1998, Evolutionary Equilibria: CharacterizationTheorems and Their Implications, Theory and Decision 45: 99-159.Bendor, Jonathan, Piotr Swistak, 2001, The Evolution of Norms, American Journal of Sociology 106 (6): 1493-1545.Binmore, Ken, 1998, Game Theory and the Social Contract, CambridgeMass.: The MIT Press (fragment).Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, Axel Ockenfels, 2004, How effective are electronic reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Management Science 50(11): 1587-602.Boyd, Robert, Peter J. Richerson, 1992, Punishment Allows the Evolutionof Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizeble Groups. "Ethnologyand Sociobiology" 13: 171-195.Gintis, Herbert, 2000, Game Theory Evolving, Princeton.: Princeton University Press (fragmenty).Leimar, Olof, Peter Hammerstein, 2001, Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences 268: 745-53.Maynard Smith J., G.R. Price, 1973, The Logic of Animal Conflict, Nature 246: 15-18.Young, H.P, 1996, The Economics of Convention, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(2): 105-122.McElreath R, R. Boyd, 2007, Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed, Chicago.: The University of Chicago Press (fragmenty).Nowak, Martin A., Karl Sigmund, 1998a, Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393: 573-7.