Between arational and irrational actions

elective seminars
general courses

(in Polish) Uczestnicy zajęć władają językiem angielskim na poziomie umożliwiającym lekturę tekstu filozoficznego.

Classroom

The seminar investigates the nature and the conditions of existence of (the possibility for one to undertake) non-rational actions. We will discuss the concept of (non)rationality of actions, which is coined in the domain of the analytic philosophy of action – the concept of minimal, instrumental rationality. On this theoretical ground, non-rational actions are the ones which do not accord with agent’s intentions, motivations or best reasons. The classic examples of non-rational actions are different types of failures, mistakes, slips and acratic actions. The course is a continuation of the seminar “Non-rational actions” conducted by the instructor during the academic year 2019/2020.

The seminar investigates the nature and the conditions of existence of (the possibility for one to undertake) non-rational actions. We will discuss the concept of (non)rationality of actions, which is coined in the domain of the analytic philosophy of action – the concept of minimal, instrumental rationality. On this theoretical ground, non-rational actions are the ones which do not accord with agent’s intentions, motivations or best reasons. The classic examples of non-rational actions are different types of failures, mistakes, slips and acratic actions. However, as we shall see, the existence of non-rational actions is controversial. Also, several important theories of action face problems with their proper conceptualization. The question is, whether such theories may count as adequate theories of action and what the putative existence of non-rational actions tells us about the nature of agency.

In the course of the seminar we will discuss texts on two topics: (1) the scope of the concept of intentional action (i.e. rational in the minimal, instrumental sense), (2) the nature of non-rational actions. The former includes the texts on the selected forms of intentional action. The latter includes the texts on the forms of non-rational actions most discussed in the philosophical tradition: acratic actions and slips.

The course is a continuation of the seminar “Non-rational actions” conducted by the instructor during the academic year 2019/2020.

The plan of the seminar meetings:

INTRODUCTION (2h)

I. AKRASIA (14h)

Davidson, D. (1985) Incoherence and Irrationality, in: Davidson D. (2004) Problems of Rationality

Hill, T. (1986) Weakness of Will and Character, Philosophical Topics 14, pp. 93-115.

Frankfurt, H. (1988) Rationality and the Unthinkable, in Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

McIntyre, A. (1993) Is Acratic Action Always Irrational, in: Flangan, O., Rorty, A. (ed.) Identity, Character and Morality, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Darwall, S. (1986) Rational Acts, Philosophical Topics 14, pp. 33-57.

Rorty, A. (1980) Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?, Australian Journal of Philosophy 58, pp. 333-46.

Piłat, R. (2013) Słaba wola, in: Aporie samowiedzy Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa.

II. SELF-DECEPTION (8h)

Audi, R. (1982) Self-Deception, Action, and Will, Erkenntnis, 18, pp. 133–158.

Davidson, D. (1986) Deception and Division, in: Davidson D. (2004) Problems of Rationality

Holton, R. (2001) What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101(1), pp. 53–69.

Piłat, R. (2013) Samozakłamanie, in: Aporie samowiedzy Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa.

III. SLIPS (6h)

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention, 2nd edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. (fragments)

Freud, Z. (2019) Psychopatologia życia codziennego. Marzenia senne, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa. (fragments)

Peabody, K. (2005) Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips? Philosophia 35, pp. 173-216.

Amaya, S. (2013) Slips, Noûs 47 (3), pp. 559-576.

Amaya, S. (2013) Slips, Noûs 47 (3), str. 559-576.

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention, 2nd edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Audi, R. (1982) Self-Deception, Action, and Will, Erkenntnis, 18, str. 133–158.

Darwall, S. (1986) Rational Acts, Philosophical Topics 14, str. 33-57.

Davidson, D. (1985) Incoherence and Irrationality, w: Davidson D. (2004) Problems of Rationality

Davidson, D. (1986) Deception and Division, w: Davidson D. (2004) Problems of Rationality

Frankfurt, H. (1988) Rationality and the Unthinkable, w tegoż: The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Freud, Z. (2019) Psychopatologia życia codziennego. Marzenia senne, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa.

Hill, T. (1986) Weakness of Will and Character, Philosophical Topics 14, str. 93-115.

Holton, R. (2001) What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101(1), str. 53–69.

McIntyre, A. (1993) Is Acratic Action Always Irrational, w Flangan, O., Rorty, A. (red.) Identity, Character and Morality, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Peabody, K. (2005) Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips? Philosophia 35, str. 173-216.

Piłat, R. (2013) Samozakłamanie, w tegoż: Aporie samowiedzy Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa.

Piłat, R. (2013) Słaba wola, w tegoż: Aporie samowiedzy Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa.

Rorty, A. (1980) Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?, Australian Journal of Philosophy 58, str. 333-46.

- The participants are acquainted with the classical and the contemporary conceptions on non-rational actions coined in the domain of analytic philosophy of action.

- The participants deeply understand the significance and the limitations of the philosophical investigations on mind and action as compared with the empirical surveys conducted in this domain.

- The participants are acquainted with the difference between the philosophical and the common-sense views on mind and action.

- The participants are acquainted with the conceptions of selected forms of intentional action fuller than the participants of the basic course in the philosophy of action .

- The participants identify problems in the conceptualization of non-rational actions on the ground of the theories discussed during the course of the seminar.

- The participants identify the limitations of the theories of action, which do not provide an account of non-rational aspects of our agency.

- The participants differentiate between the empirical, common-sense and philosophical problems related with non-rational actions.

- The participants analyse complicated philosophical argumentations, identify the theses of these argumentations, understand the logical and argumentative relations between the theses analysed in the course of the seminar.

- The participants are interested in the question of the distinctiveness of the philosophical investigations and their impact on the common-sense and the scientific understanding of mind and action.

- The participants are interested in the philosophical investigations on the non-rational aspects of the human nature and in the limitations of the philosophical investigations in this domain.

Students will be evaluated as follows:

- presence at the seminar,

- speech on one of the seminar’s reading

Permissible number of absences: 3