Non-rational actions

elective seminars
general courses

(in Polish) - Uczestnicy zajęć władają językiem angielskim na poziomie umożliwiającym lekturę tekstu filozoficznego.

- Mile widziane (choć niekonieczne) jest by uczestnik zajęć ukończył wcześniej kurs filozofii działania. W bieżącym roku akademickim kurs taki odbędzie się w semestrze zimowym.

Classroom

The seminar investigates the nature and the conditions of existence of (the possibility for one to undertake) non-rational actions. We will discuss the concept of (non)rationality of actions, which is coined in the domain of the analytic philosophy of action – the concept of minimal, instrumental rationality. On this theoretical ground, non-rational actions are the ones which do not accord with agent’s intentions, motivations or best reasons. The classic examples of non-rational actions are different types of failures, mistakes, slips and acratic actions. However, as we shall see, the existence of non-rational actions is controversial. Also, several important theories of action face problems with their proper conceptualization. The question is, whether such theories may count as adequate theories of action and what the putative existence of non-rational actions tells us about the nature of agency.

The seminar investigates the nature and the conditions of existence of (the possibility for one to undertake) non-rational actions. We will discuss the concept of (non)rationality of actions, which is coined in the domain of the analytic philosophy of action – the concept of minimal, instrumental rationality. On this theoretical ground, non-rational actions are the ones which do not accord with agent’s intentions, motivations or best reasons. The classic examples of non-rational actions are different types of failures, mistakes, slips and acratic actions. However, as we shall see, the existence of non-rational actions is controversial. Also, several important theories of action face problems with their proper conceptualization. The question is, whether such theories may count as adequate theories of action and what the putative existence of non-rational actions tells us about the nature of agency.

In the course of the seminar we will discuss texts on two topics: (1) the scope of the concept of intentional action (i.e. rational in the minimal, instrumental sense), (2) the nature of non-rational actions. The former includes the texts on the selected forms of intentional action. The latter includes the texts on the forms of non-rational actions most discussed in the philosophical tradition: acratic actions and slips.

The plan of the seminar meetings:

INTRODUCTION (2h)

I. THE LIMITS OF INTENTIONAL AGENCY (6h)

1. Intentional action and action with intention (2h)

Reading: Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (fragments)

2. Habitual actions (2h)

Reading: Pollard, B. (2006) Explaining Actions with Habits, American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1), p. 57 - 69.

3. Actions without reasons (2h)

Reading: Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention, 2nd edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. (fragments)

II. NON-RATIONAL ACTIONS (20h)

4. Types of non-rational actions (2h)

Reading: Hursthouse, R. (1991), Arational Actions, Journal of Philosophy 88, p. 57-68.

5. Akrasia (12h)

5.1. Traditional conceptions of akratic actions. Davidson’s proposal (2h)

Reading: Davidson, D. (1969) How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? w: Davidson (1980).

5.2. Weakness of will and future directed intentions (2h)

Reading: Holton, R. (1999). Intention and weakness of will, Journal of Philosophy, 96, p. 241-262.

5.3. Weakness of will and the common sense psychology (2h)

Reading: Mele, A. (2010) Weakness of will and akrasia, Philosophical Studies 150 (3), p. 391-404.

5.4. Ethical theories of akrasia (2h)

Arpaly, N. (2000), On acting rationally against one’s best judgment, Ethic, 110, 488-513.

5.5. Psychological theories of akrasia (2h)

Reading: Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, Nowy Jork. (fragments)

5.6. Akrasia, addiction and compulsion (2h)

Reading:

Rachlin, H. (2000) The Science of Self-Control, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. (fragments)

Zaragoza, K. (2006). What happens when someone acts compulsively? Philosophical Studies, 131, p. 150-156.

6. Slips (6h)

6.1. The classical theories of slips (2h)

Reading: Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention, 2nd edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. (fragments)

Freud, Z. (2019) Psychopatologia życia codziennego. Marzenia senne, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa. (fragments)

6.2. The question of the intentional character of slips. Part I (2h)

Reading: Peabody, K. (2005) Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips? Philosophia 35, p. 173-216.

6.3. The question of the intentional character of slips. Part II (2h)

Reading: Amaya, S. (2013) Slips, Noûs 47 (3), p. 559-576.

REVISION (2h)

Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, Nowy Jork.

Amaya, S. (2013) Slips, Noûs 47 (3), str. 559-576.

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention, 2nd edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Arpaly, N. (2000), On acting rationally against one’s best judgment, Ethic, 110, 488-513.

Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Davidson, D. (1969) How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? w: Davidson (1980).

Davidson, D. (1980), Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Freud, Z. (2019) Psychopatologia życia codziennego. Marzenia senne, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa.

Holton, R. (1999). Intention and weakness of will, Journal of Philosophy, 96, str. 241-262.

Hursthouse, R. (1991), Arational Actions, Journal of Philosophy 88, str. 57-68.

Mele, A. (2010) Weakness of will and akrasia, Philosophical Studies 150 (3), str. 391-404.

Peabody, K. (2005) Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and

Slips? Philosophia 35, 173-216.

Pollard, B. (2006) Explaining Actions with Habits, American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1), str. 57 - 69.

Rachlin, H. (2000) The Science of Self-Control, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Zaragoza, K. (2006). What happens when someone acts compulsively? Philosophical Studies, 131, str. 150-156.

- The participants are acquainted with the classical and the contemporary conceptions on non-rational actions coined in the domain of analytic philosophy of action.

- The participants deeply understand the significance and the limitations of the philosophical investigations on mind and action as compared with the empirical surveys conducted in this domain.

- The participants are acquainted with the difference between the philosophical and the common-sense views on mind and action.

- The participants are acquainted with the conceptions of selected forms of intentional action fuller than the participants of the basic course in the philosophy of action .

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- The participants identify problems in the conceptualization of non-rational actions on the ground of the theories discussed during the course of the seminar.

- The participants identify the limitations of the theories of action, which do not provide an account of non-rational aspects of our agency.

- The participants differentiate between the empirical, common-sense and philosophical problems related with non-rational actions.

- The participants analyse complicated philosophical argumentations, identify the theses of these argumentations, understand the logical and argumentative relations between the theses analysed in the course of the seminar.

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- The participants are interested in the question of the distinctiveness of the philosophical investigations and their impact on the common-sense and the scientific understanding of mind and action.

- The participants are interested in the philosophical investigations on the non-rational aspects of the human nature and in the limitations of the philosophical investigations in this domain.

Students will be evaluated as follows:

- presence at the seminar,

- speech on one of the seminar’s reading,

- writing on one of the topics discussed in the course of the seminar.