Identity and properties in metaphysics of science

ogólnouniwersyteckie
seminaria monograficzne

Some course in logic or mathematics passed with grade at least good (4).

This seminar will discuss the metaphysical problems related to the concepts of individuals, properties and relations. The main focus will be on the distinction between individuality and generality. We will also discuss the distinction between qualitative (pure) and non-qualitative (impure) properties and the role and metaphysical meaning of symmetries in science. Particular attention will be paid to the modal aspect of these issues, in particular a debate between haecceitism and anti-haecceitism and its consequences for the ontology of physical theories, such as quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity. The seminar will be based on the most recent philosophical literature.

This seminar will focus on the fundamental metaphysical questions regarding the concept of individual objects, their identity and discernibility, their properties and relations, as well as their modal profiles. According to a popular ontological and semantical view, all facts taking place in the world can be reduced to ‘individualized’ or ‘atomic’ facts expressible in the form of (a combination of) elementary sentences attributing properties and relations to individual objects. Thus the underlying assumption is that there are two categories of objects: bare, property-less entities (individuals), and properties with relations. However, the first category of objects raises a number of epistemological and ontological concerns. There are many philosophers who reject the above-mentioned view and adopt instead a broad position of generalism, which prohibits the use of individual constants referring to bare particulars. The only admissible linguistic expressions are: predicates denoting genuine properties and relations, variables with quantifiers, and possibly the symbol of identity (even though this is controversial and requires a separate discussion). Moreover, given that bare individuals do not differ from each other with respect to any properties, the generalists often assume that an appropriate language should be permutation-invariant. A radical version of generalism, defended by Shamik Dasgupta, jettisons individuals altogether, assuming only the existence of properties and relations This of course requires a new linguistic and formal representation of ordinary statements of fact, which will be discussed in the seminar.

A related problem is how to precisely characterize the concept of genuine properties and relations, in order to avoid including so-called impure properties, such as being the first-born son of Napoleon. Including such properties in a generalist, non-individualistic language defeats the purpose, since in order to interpret appropriate predicates, we have to make reference to certain individuals regardless of their possessed qualities (keep in mind that the property of being the first-born son of Napoleon is not the same as the property of being the first-born son of a person possessing such-and-such DNA). Yet philosophers disagree how we should define qualitative, or pure properties, and some even claim that this can’t be done. We will discuss some main attempts to make precise a distinction between pure and impure properties, and we will analyze their shortcomings and possible ways to repair them.

Another connected issue is the modal status of individuals. There are two dominating views regarding modality de re (modality of statements about individuals): haecceitism and anti-haecceitism. Haecceitism claims that it is possible to have two qualitatively indistinguishable situations which nevertheless differ with respect to which individuals occupy which positions (such a difference is commonly called “haecceitistic”). Anti-haecceitism denies the existence of such a possibility. The debate between these two approaches (with the third one being David Lewis’s ‘cheap haecceitism’) rages on with no end in sight. Recently, a number of arguments in favor of the stance of haecceitism have been proposed, making reference to the probability calculus, counterfactual conditionals, as well as to some hypothetical scenarios involving classical physical systems. On the other hand, anti-hacceitism seems to receive strong support from science, in particular physics. Anti-haecceitist versions of modality de re based on the concept of essential properties (or, more broadly, essential relational structures) fit well the way quantum mechanics describes states of systems of many particles. Essentialist interpretations of spacetime regions and points also help solve the well-known puzzle affecting general relativity, namely the hole argument. Thus while discussing these pure metaphysical and semantical issues we will enter the area of philosophy of physics in its latest form.

Brighouse, C. (2018), “Confessions of a (Cheap) Sophisticated Substantivalist”, Foundations of Physics, doi: 10.1007/s10701-018-0228-2.

Cowling, S. (2015), “Non-qualitative properties”, Erkenntnis 80, 273-301.

Cowling, S. (2017), “Conceivability arguments for haecceitism”, Synthese 194:4171–4190.

Dasgupta, S. (2009), “Individuals: an essay in revisionary metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies 145, 35-67.

Dasgupta, S. (2011), “The bare necessities”, Philosophical Perspectives 25, 115-160.

Dasgupta, S. (2016), “Symmetry as an epistemic notion (twice over)”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67, 837-878.

Fara, D.G. (2009), “Dear Haecceitism”, Erkenntnis 70, 285-297.

Kment, B. (2012), “Haecceitism, chance and counterfactuals”, Philosophical Review 121 (4), 573-609.

Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell.

Lewis, D. (1983), “Individuation by acquaintance and by stipulation”

Plate, J. (2021), “Qualitative properties and relations”, Philosophical Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01708-y.

Skow, B. (2008), “Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism and Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Quarterly 58, 98-107.

Skow, B. (2011), “More on Haecceitism and Possible Worlds”, Analytic Philosophy 52, 267-269.

The students will learn about the metaphysical and logical problems associated with the concepts of individuality and generality, including their modal aspects. They will also acquire knowledge about the connection between these problems and the development of scientific theories, in particular theories in physics.

The students will acquire skills to critically analyze modern metaphysical conceptions related to the problem of individuality and generality. They will also hone their argumentative skills and their abilities to give philosophical presentations.

The students will learn how to interact with their peers in the academic setting.

Educational effects for doctoral students:

The students know and understand the methodology of research in the area of metaphysics of individuals, properties and relations;

They can use the knowledge acquired in the seminar to creatively identify, formulate and solve complex problems, define the aims and the subject of the research in the metaphysics of individuality and generality.

They can critically analyze and evaluate the results of research in the metaphysics of individuals and properties.

They can participate in the debates regarding the metaphysics of individuals, identity and properties.

Each student is required to give at least one presentation (which can be a joint one) and write a short essay based on the literature discussed. Doctoral students participating in the seminar will be given a more comprehensive and advanced topic for their essay, with some additional literature.

Number of absences: 2